Bryan L. Slade v. Eleanor A. Sanchez Dennis : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1978
Bryan L. Slade v. Eleanor A. Sanchez Dennis : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
E. H. Fankhauser; Cotro-Manes, Warr, Fankhauser & Green; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent;
Judith Romney WOlbach; Attorney for Defendant-Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Slade v. Dennis, No. 15710 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1182
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRYAN L. SLADE, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
ELEANOR A. SANCHEZ DENNIS, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Civil No. z36346 
1.S-711) 
/tPPE. L.L~  
BRIEF OF ~ii! S£3SLl!J F 
E. H. FANKHAUSER 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JUDITH ROMNEY WOLBACH 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
Attorney for Respondent. 
FILED 
MAY 10 1978 
----··-----------------------------------
Clerk, Supremo Court, Utah j Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by th  Institut  f M seum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BRYAN L. SLADE, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
ELEANOR A. SANCHEZ DENNIS, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Civil No. 236340 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
E. H. FANKHAUSER 
430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JUDITH ROMNEY WOLBACH 
409 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
Attorney for Respondent. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE------------------------- 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT-------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL----------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS---------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS 
SHOULD BE THE PRIMARY CONCERN IN 
DETERMINING QUESTIONS OF VISITATION 
PRIVILEGES----------------------------- 5 
POINT II. RESPONDENT HAS NOT ESTAB-
LISHED THAT VISITATION WITH RESPONDENT 
IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD-- 7 
POINT III. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN 
FINDING FOR THE RESPONDENT ABSENT 
EVIDENCE THAT VISITATION IS IN THE 
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD------------ 9 
POINT IV. RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO RIGHTS EQUAL TO THOSE OF A DIVORCED 
FATHER--------------------------------- 9 
POINT V. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN 
FINDING RESPONDENT TO HAVE LEGITIMATED 
THE CHILD BY ACKNOWLEDGMENT, PURSUANT 
TO §78-30-12, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953----------------------------------- 13 
A. General 13 
B. Because Corey has not been 
received into respondent's family, 
the Court below erred in finding 
respondent to have legitimated 
the child----------------------- 15 
i. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
C. Because respondent has not held 
out Corey's mother, the appellant, 
to be his wife, the Court below 
erred in finding respondent to 
have legitimated the child------- 19 
D. Because appellant has not relin-
quished exclusive custody and 
control of Corey, the Court below 
erred in finding respondent to 
have L~gitimated this child------ 19 
E. Because respondent had not made 
meaningful contribution to Corey's 
support, the Court below erred in 
finding respondent to have legiti-
mated this child----------------- 21 
POINT VI. A FINDING THAT RESPONDENT 
HAD COMPLIED WITH §78-30-12 DID NOT 
COMPEL AN AWARD OF VISITATION RIGHTS 
TO RESPONDENT BY THE COURT-------------- 22 
POINT VII. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN 
FAILING TO RECOGNIZE APPELLANT'S RIGHT 
TO EXCLUSIVE CUSTODY AND CONTROL OVER 
HER OUT-OF-WEDLOCK CHILD---------------- 24 
POINT VIII. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN 
FAILING TO AFFORD APPELLANT THE SAME 
RIGHT TO WITHHOLD CONSENT TO LEGITI-
MATION AS HAS BEEN CONFERRED BY 
STATUTE ON THE WIFE OF A BIOLOGICAL 
FATHER---------------------------------- 27 
POINT IX. THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN 
FAILING TO PROTECT DEFENDANT'S CON-
STITUTIONAL RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN 
FAMILY RELATIONS AS IT BEARS UPON 
THE CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS-------------- 29 
SUMMARY---------------------------------------- 32 
CONCLUSION------------------------------------- 33 
ii. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES CITED 
u. S. Constitution, Fourteenth 
Amendment-------------------------------------
STATUTES 
§230, California Civil Code 
§77-60-12 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
§78-30-4 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
§78-30-10 Utah Code Annotated 
§78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
CASES 
Adoption of Irby, in re, 37 Cal.Rptr. 
879, 881 (Cal. App. 1964) 
Adoption of Pierce, in re, 15 Cal.App.3d 244, 
93 Cal.Rptr. 197 (Cal.App. 1971) 
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 56 Misc. 2d 711, 
289 N.Y.S. 2d 792, 794 (N.Y. City Ct. 1968) 
Cheryl Lynn H. v. Superior Court, 
41 Cal. App. 3d 273, 277-78, 115 Cal.Rptr. 
849, 852 (Cal. App. 1974) 
Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206 Pa.Super. 
397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965) 
Darwin v. Granger, 174 Cal.App. 2d 63, 
72, 344 P.2d 353, 358 
DeLaveaga, in estate of, 142 Cal. 158, 
75 Pac. 790 
DePhillips v. DePhillips, 219 N.E. 2d 465 
(Ill. 1966) 
iii. 
10,30 
14,23,27,28 
25,26 
26 
23 
4 I 
20,28 
17,18,21,28,30 
26 
20 
5 I 24 
15,17,28 
17 
26 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
Guardianship of Truschke, 237 Cal.App.2d 75, 
76-77, 46 Cal.Rptr. 601, 603, 604 (Cal.App. 
(1965) 
Jensen v. Earley, 63 Utah 604, 611-12, 
2 2 8 Pac. 21 7 , 219- 2 0 ( 19 2 4) 
Kessler's Estate, re, 74 N.W. 2d 599 
(S. D. 1956) 
Lund's Estate, in re, 159 P.2d 643, 654 
May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953) 
McNamara, estate of, 181 Cal. 82, 
183 P. 552 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1932) 
Peterson's Estate, in re, 214 Cal.App.2d 258, 
29 Cal.Rptr. 384 (Cir. Ct. 1963) 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925) 
Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) 
Quilloin v. Wolcott, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978) 
Reyna, in re, 55 Cal.App. 3d 288, 298, 
126 Cal.Rptr.138, 145 (Ct.App.Cal.) 
(1976) 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) 
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) 
State in the Interest of M., 25 Utah 2d 101, 
105, 476 P.2d 1013, 1015-17 (1970) 
Sullivan v. Bonafonte, 376 A.2d 69 (1977) 
iv. 
30,31 
16 
24 
15 
23 
29 
23 
29,30 
15 
30 
31 
30 
10 I 11, 12 r 13 
16 
29 
10,13,26 
24,25,29,30 
5,6,24 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Thomas v. Children's Aid Society of Ogden, 
12 Utah 2d, 235, 364 P.2d 1029 (1961) 25 
Wallace v. Wallace, 210 N.E. 2d 4 (Ill. 1965) 26 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) 31 
SECONDARY AUTHORITIES 
Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 705 
Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 417 
J. Harkins, "Putative Father's Visitation 
Rights," 19 CLEV. ST. L.REV. 549 (1970) 
Goldstein, Freud, & Solnit, Beyond the 
Best Interests of the Child, (1973) 
Note, 12 SO. CAL. L. REV. ( 19 3 8) 
H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations (1968) 
Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed., 1968) 
73 Arn.Jur.2d, Statutes, §166 
R. Aaron, "Proposals for Truce in the 
Holy War: Utah Adoption," 1970 UTAH 
L.REV. 325 (1970) 
Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 216 
15 
5,24,25 
5,24 
5 
14,19 
15 
23 
23 
24 
25 
Note: All references to the record and to trial transcripts 
are cited as follows: 
Record -- "R" 
Transcript, April 15, 1977 -- "Trans. A" 
Transcript, May 26, 1977 -- "Trans. B" 
v. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the Court below, respondent Bryan L. Slade sought 
judgment finding him to have legitimated Corey Leon Slade and 
awarding him visitation rights. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In the Court below, Judge Dean E. Conder, by temporary 
order, awarded respondent visitation rights on alternate week-
ends. Upon conclusion of trial, after having taken the matter 
under advisement, Judge David K. Winder found respondent to 
have legitimated this child; found that respondent was entitled 
to have visitation with this child once a month only, from 
10:00 A.M. to 6:00 P.M. on the third Saturday of each month; 
and ordered respondent to pay child support in the amount of 
$150.00 a month, although appellant had not counter-claimed 
or otherwise prayed for child support. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant appeals from the decision of the Court below, 
seeking reversal in toto, or in the alternative, reversal 
limited to that part of the Decree which awarded to respondent 
rights of visitation. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1973, dppellant conceived Corey Leon Slade, her son. 
She asked respondent, father of her child, to marry her so th~ 
she could give this child a home. His response was to tell ~r 
to get an abortion. Appellant refused as this was morally re-
pugnant to her. Later he asked her to have the child adopted 
at his expense. She refused as her maternal feeling for the 
unborn child was so strong that the prospect of giving up her 
child was unacceptable to her. (Trans. A, p. 57, 1. 19-p. 58, 
p. 10) 
On March 30, 1974, Corey was born out of wedlock. His 
father had not prepared a home for him, choosing instead to 
reside alone in the house he was purchasing while Corey lived 
with appellant in proverty-level lodging. 
1. 15, et seq.) 
(Trans. A, p. 58, 
After Corey was born, respondent paid the medical expense; 
of his birth, as requested by appellant's mother. (Trans. B, 
p. 18, 1. 5) Before Corey's birth, respondent signed, upon 
request of appellant, a Declaration of Paternity, statins his 
willingness to support the child. (Trans. A, p. 3, 1. 29-
p. 4, 1. 6) 
Respondent did not support Corey. Not until so ordered 
by Judge David K. Winder on September 23, 1977 (R.96), three 
years and four months later, did he make meaningful contributior 
to the child's support. 
-2-
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Respondent visited sporadically with Corey during his 
infancy. (Trans. A, p. 59, 11. 25-29) He gave Corey toys. 
He introduced Corey to members of his family, but at no time 
did Corey even remain overnight with respondent. Corey never 
stayed or resided with respondent in his home. No de facto 
family relationship of mother, father, and child was ever 
established. And respondent has never represented appellant 
to be his wife. 
Respondent has not participated in the child's religious 
or secular education. He has assumed no responsibility for 
his physical, mental, and spiritual development and well being. 
The evidence shows only that he has enjoyed his playmate status 
with Corey. 
On May 15, 1976, appellant married Carmen Richard Dennis, 
who had, over a period of many months before this marriage, 
developed a strong, warm relationship with Corey. It was --
and it remains -- Mr. Dennis's intent to adopt Corey. Perhaps 
aware of this intent, on or about July 13, 1976, respondent 
filed his complaint and had issued his Order to Show Cause in 
this action in the Third District Court, State of Utah. Also, 
upon advice of counsel, respondent filed an Acknowledgement of 
Paternity at this time. (Trans. A, p. 3, 1. 29-p. 4, 1. 6) 
On July 21, 1976, Judge Dean E. Conder issued an order 
granting respondent visitation on alternate weekends, requir-
ing respondent's counsel to file a memorandum of points and 
authorities, and requiring the parties to engage a psychiatrist 
-3-
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or other competent professional to evaluate the effect on the 
child of visitation with respondent. (R. Upon respondent's 1• 
recommendation, Dr. Delbert T. Goates, M.D., was engaged to 
interview Corey, ap~ellant, her husband, and respondent, and 
to submit his findings and recommendations to the Court. Dr. 
Goates' report, recommending termination of the relationship 
of Corey and respondent, was filed with the Court on December 
1, 1976. (R. 119-134.) 
On April 15, 1977, and May 26, 1977, trial was had in thi:I 
matter before Judge David K. Winder without a jury. 
At trial, appellant testified that visitation with re-
spondent had been harmful to Corey and that it is not in his 
best interests. Her testimony, corroborated by other witnesses. 
was not rebutted by respondent. Testimony of expert witnesses,: 
Dr. Goates and Virginia Husband, M. S. W., established that visi·i 
tation with respondent is not in the best interests of the chilcj 
i 
(Trans. B, pp. 27-28, 32-34, 37-44, 45-48) 
Nevertheless, by Memorandum Decision, dated August 1, 
1977, Judge David K. Winder, ruling that Corey had been legit~ 
mated pursuant to §78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, found 
for respondent, although decreasing his visitation to only s~ 
(6) hours a month and ordering him to pay, although appellant 
had not so prayed, child support in the amount of $150.00 per 
month . ( R. 9 1 . ) 
-4-
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Subsequently, following denial of various motions for 
reconsideration submitted by the parties, appellant, on or about 
February 27, 1978, filed her Notice of Appeal. 
POINT I. 
THE CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS SHOULD 
BE THE PRIMARY CONCERN IN DETERMINING 
QUESTIONS OF VISITATION PRIVILEGES. 
It has been uniformly recognized, in determining awards 
of visitation to fathers of children born out of wedlock, that 
the best interests of the child rather than the rights or alleged 
rights of the parent, or parents, are of paramount importance. 
See,~·~·· Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 417, 421-28; J. Harkins, 
''Putative Father's Visitation Rights," 19 CLEV.ST.L.REV. 549 
(1970). See also, generally, Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit, 
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973). 
For example, the Pennsylvania court in Commonwealth v. 
Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965), stated: 
[E]very case must be decided on the basis of its 
own particular facts. The unique problems of each 
child must receive individual attention and considera-
tion. Any attempt by us to determine the best interest 
of every child by a single rule would be judicially, 
socially, and morally unsound. Id., at 158. 
Appellant calls the attention of the Court to yet another 
authority supporting this principle. In Sullivan v. Bonafonte, 
376 A.2d 69 (1977), the Connecticut Supreme Court applied this 
principle, that the paramount consideration is the child's best 
-5-
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interest, to a case involving a putative father's visitation 
privileges. The Court noted that the father -- who initially 
refused to marry the child's mother when she was pregnant, who 1 
urged her to have an abortion, who voluntarily helped pay some 
of the medical expenses associated with the child's birth, and 
1 
who sent child support money and Christmas gifts -- had visitec 
the child only infrequently when he was between three and six 
months old. Further, the father did not introduce evidence 
showing that the child needed to be given the chance to 
develop a relationship with him or that visitation would have 1 
a "positive effect" on the child. The Connecticut Supreme Cour:' 
affirmed the lower Court's determination that visitation would I 
not be in the child's best interests. 
In the words of the Court, the "friction which would be ! 
engendered by court-ordered visitation was not offset by any 
prospective benefit to the child, nor was the child threatened' 
by the termination of an important existing relationship." 
Id., at 71. 
The parallels between Sullivan and the instant case are 
strikingly obvious. Expert testimony introduced at trial al~ 
found no positive benefit to Corey accruing from visitation by. 
the plaintiff. (Trans. B, pp. 27-28, 32-34, 37-44, 45-48~ ~-
spondent has not and cannot deny that Corey's best interests 
are paramount. Further, he has not challenged or contested 
appellant's argument that her family's right of privacy should 
-6-
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be weighed in considering Corey's best interests and that this 
child would directly benefit from the protection of that family 
privacy. See Point IX, infra. 
POINT II. 
RESPONDENT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED 
THAT VISITATION WITH RESPONDENT 
IS IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD 
Respondent acknowledged at trial, in preliminary comment, 
his burden of proving that Corey's best interests should be para-
mount in determination of the visitation issued. (Trans. A, 
p. 6, 11. 9-14) 
Respondent did not meet this burden of proof. 
Respondent did not rebut or challenge Dr. Goates' find-
ings that respondent is "primarily immature," that he "has 
difficulty making decisions on an altruistic basis," and that 
he makes decisions "on an infantile basis of seeking his own 
gratification." Respondent did not rebut or challenge Dr. 
Goates' recommendations. 
For the welfare of the child, it would be optimal if 
he were provided the opportunity to have a divorce, as 
did his mother, from Mr. Slade. However, there is no 
divorce involved inasmuch as his mother was never married. 
Indeed, she could have had him aborted, and there would 
be no further litigation. It was her decision not to 
have an abortion; she kept him, and it would be her pre-
ference that he be adopted by her husband. For the 
welfare of Corey, who primarily knows no other father 
than Mr. Dennis except as a gentleman who, for his own 
needs, periodically comes to visit him, it would be 
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preferable if a complete separation between the biologi-
cal father and the child would occur just as if he had-
been adopted out rather than aborted and that he now be 
allowed to be adopted by his mother's husband -- indeed 
this represents an optimal circumstance, inasmuch as he 
could well be reared by his natural mother and her pre-
sent consort. (Report, R. 133) [Emphasis added] 
Mrs. Virginia Husband, certified clinical social worker, 
expert witness for the appellant, testified that all of Corey's 
needs for a father were being met by appellant's husband and 
that Corey was in no need for additional fathering by the res~ 
dent. (Trans. B, p. 27, 1. 27, p. 28, 1. 23) Finding that furthE: 
visitation by the respondent with Corey would result in diffi-
culty, confusion and conflict, Mrs. Husband summarized respon-
dent's conduct as "a dastardly thing to do to a child." (Trans. 
B, p. 32, 11. 20-25) She further testified that such visitrtk 
would place Corey's self-esteem and self-confidence in jeopardy. 
(Trans. B, p 33, 11. 1-9) 
Testimony of the appellant and her witnesses further cor· 
roborated the expert testimony of Dr. Goates and Mrs. Husband. 
Appellant testified that on April 23, 1977, Corey returned frorr 
a visit with respondent with motorcycle burns on his leg and th' 
on other occasions he had returned from such visits with soiled 
pants. (Trans. B, p. 4, 1. 19-p. 5, 1. 2) Testimony of Julia 
Sanchez established that the respondent volunteered no explana·, 
tion of these burns. (Trans. B, p. 20, 11. 17-24). In addil~ 
Carmen R. Dennis testified that the child has returned from 
visits with the respondent tired and in ill humor. (Trans. B, 
p. 9, 11. 8, 9) 
-8-
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No testimony was elicited from any witness that the re-
spondent has in any way contributed to the moral, intellectual, 
or physical development of Corey or that respondent has the 
capacity, skills, or inclination to do so in the future. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING 
FOR THE RESPONDENT ABSENT EVIDENCE 
THAT VISITATION IS IN THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
Judge David K. Winder's Memorandum Decision, dated August 
1, 1977, makes no mention of Corey's best interests, and this 
issue is not touched upon in his Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, filed September 23, 1977 (R. 93). Appellant's motion to 
amend these documents to, inter alia, incorporate this issue 
was denied. See Memorandum Decision, dated January 24, 1978 
(R. 107). The decision to award judgment in favor of the respon-
dent, however reluctant, appears to be grounded entirely on 
Judge Winder's conclusion that respondent had legitimated the 
child pursuant to §78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. As the 
preponderance of the evidence established that visitation with 
the respondent was detrimental to Corey's best interest, the 
Court below was in error. 
POINT IV. 
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
RIGHTS EQUAL TO THOSE OF A 
DIVORCED FATHER 
-9-
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Some months after judgment in this matter, the United 
States Supreme Court considered the question of whether or not 
principles of equal protection require the same standard to bE 
applied to married and unmarried fathers. The Court found no 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in a Georgia statutory scheme which, as applied, gav; 
fit fathers of legitimate children the authority to veto ado~ 
tion while denying this right to fathers of illegitimate chil-
dren. Quilloin v. Walcott, 54 L·Ed.2d 511 (1978) 
In affirming the decision of the Georgia tribunal, the 
Court also considered the countervailing parental interests 
posited by the biological father's assertions of legitimation 
and his alleged rights of visitation and the appellee's all~~ 
tions of disruption of the de ~family unit,counter to the 
best interests of the child. Thus, the Court addressed the q~ 
tion left unresolved in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
.the degree of protection 
the rights of an unwed father 
that presented here, in which 
terests are more substantial. 
a State must afford to 
in a situation, such as 
the countervailing in-
Quilloin, at 511. 
The trial court had found that the appellant father had · 
provided support only on an irregular basis, that he had visite 
with his child on "many occasions," that he had given the chili 
toys and other gifts, and that his contacts with the child w~ 
having a disruptive effect on the child and on the appellee'sr 
tire family. On the basis of these findings and others pertain•' 
-10-
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to appellee's marriage and the mother's uninterrupted custody, 
the Court determined adoption to be in the best interest of the 
child and found legitimation and visitation rights to be counter 
to the best interests of the child. Id., at 517. 
Claiming violation of the Equal Protection and Due Process 
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, appellant took an appeal to 
the Georgia Supreme Court. In affirming for the appellee, this 
Court relied generally on the strong state policy of rearing 
children in a family setting, emphasized that the adoption was 
being sought by the child's stepfather who was part of the family 
unit, and noted in addition that the appellant biological father 
had never been a de facto member of the child's family unit. 
In affirming the decision of the Georgia Court, the United 
States Supreme Court found no violation of the rights secured to 
the biological father under the Fourteenth Amendment, finding his 
interests readily distinguishable from those of divorced fathers. 
In so concluding, the Court observed that although the 
biological father had been subject to support obligations, unlike 
a divorced father, he had never exercised actual or legal custody 
over the child, and had thus never assumed any significant re-
sponsibility for his daily supervision, education, protection, 
or care. Id., at 520. 
In the case now under consideration, this equal protection 
issue was initially raised at trial by respondent. For example, 
-11-
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see the cross-examination of Mrs. Husband in which respondent 
attempts to establish that al though visitation may cause diffi 
culties, these must be endured equally whether or not the chli 
was born in wedlock. (Trans. B, p 41, 1. 14, et seq.) Judge 
Winder, toward conclusion of trial, also suggested that, in h: 
opinion, divorced fathers and fathers of children born out of 
wedlock must, as a matter of law, be treated equally. 
It isn't necessarily what I would like to do any more 
than I like to have visitation by the father after 
the divorce. I think it is disruptive and I think 
it is going to be very disruptive to have Mr. Slade 
-- somewhat disruptive to have him visit with the 
child. But I think that it is inherent in any 
divorce situation. (Trans. B, p. 66, 1. 26-p. 67, 1. 1 
The relationships of the biological fathers and their~ 
of-wedlock children in Quill ion, supra, and the instant case;: 
so nearly identical that, it is respectfully submitted, had 
Quillion been decided before September 23, 1977, Judge Winder 
may well have decided in favor of the appellant, denying visit 
tion to the respondent. The following passage would have been 
considered with care. 
Appellant contends that even if he is not entitled to 
prevail as a matter of due process, principles of equ~ 
protection require that his authority to veto an adop· 
tion be measured by the same standard that would have 
been applied to a married father. In particular, appe'. 
lant asserts that his interests are indistinguishable 
from those of a married father who is separated or 
divorced from the mother and is no longer living with 
his child, and therefore the State acted impermissibly 
in treating his case differently. We think appellan~ 
interests are readily distinguishable from those of_3. 
divorced father, and accordingly believe that the StaU 
could permissively give appellant less veto authority 
than it provides to a married father. 
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Although appellant was subject, for the years prior 
to these proceedings, to essentially the same child 
support obligation as a married father would have had, 
... he has never exercised actual or legal custody 
over his child, and thus has never shouldered any signifi-
cant responsibility with respect to the daily supervi-
sion, education, protection, or care of the child. 
Appellant does not complain of his exemption from these 
responsibilities and, indeed, he does not even now seek 
custody of his child. In contrast, legal custody of 
children is of course a central aspect of the marital 
relationship, and even a father whose marriage has 
broken apart will have borne full responsibility for 
the rearing of his children during the period of the 
marriage. Under any standard of review, the State was 
not foreclosed from recognizing this difference in the 
extent of commitment to the welfare of the child. 
Id.,at 520. [Emphasis added] 
Application of Quilloin to the issues presented by the 
case now before this Court, in a manner favorable to appellant, 
would not be violative of respondent's rights to due process, as 
Quilloin does not negate rights previously conferred upon respon-
dent and persons similarly situated. Respondent's arguments to 
the Court below, citing Stanley v. Illinois, supra, as supportive 
of his alleged rights of visitation are in error. See Point VII, 
infra. 
A. General. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FINDING 
RESPONDENT TO HAVE LEGITIMATED THE 
CHILD BY ACKNOWLEDGMENT, PURSUANT 
TO §78-30-12, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953. 
In his Memorandum Decision of August 1, 1977, Judge 
Winder found the respondent to have legitimated Corey by acknowl-
edgment pursuant to §78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, for 
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the reasons that respondent was deemed to have received the 
child as his own, to have received him into his family, and to 
have treated him as a legitimate child. In so finding, the 
Court below was in error. 
Section 78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads as 
follows: 
The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly 
acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such 
with the consent of his wife, if he is married, into 
his family, and otherwise treating it as if it were 
a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such, and 
such child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legiti-
mate from the time of its birth. The foregoing pro-
visions of this chapter do not apply to such an adop-
tion. 
This statute, adopted by the Utah legislature in 1911,. 
a literal copy of §230 of the California Civil Code, first en· 
acted in 1870. 
The purpose of the California legitimation statute, and 
by direct inference that of the Utah statute, is to effect a 
change in the procedures of "legitimation." The statute is 
designed to expedite the assimilation of the previously illegit 
mate child into the home and family of its father without the 
publicity of a judicial proceeding. Note, 12 so. CAL. L. REV. 97, 
98 (1938) . It is submitted that the primary purpose of the 
statute is to confer a benefit upon the out-of-wedlock child, 
not to bestow a benefit upon his father, especially when to do 
the latter would be detrimental to the best interests of the ~ 
-14-
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While this Court has not previously had an opportunity 
to apply the statute to the questions in issue, courts in Cali-
fornia and in other states have construed like statutes in their 
own decisions. See, Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 705, 741-50. 
B. Because Corey has not been received into respondent's 
family, the Court below erred in finding respondent to have 
legitimated the child. 
Legitimation of an illegitimate child under the California 
species of legitimation statute has been held to require proof 
that the biological father received the child into his family, 
with the consent of his wife, if he is married. In re Peterson's 
Estate, 214 Cal.App.2d 258, 29 Cal.Rptr. 384 (Cir.Ct. 1963); 
H. CLARK. LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 160 (1968) . Reception into 
the father's family implies some residence of the child with 
the father. See,~-~·· Re Kessler's Estate, 74 N.W.2d 599 (S.D. 
1956); Clark, supra, at 160-61; Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 705, 784 
(1954). 
The statute clearly indicates that the relationship con-
templated is the equivalent of the adoption of a non-related 
child. Actual residence in the home and family of the biologi-
cal father is required. In re Reyna, 55 Cal.App.3d 288, 298, 
126 Cal.Rptr. 138, 145 (Ct. App. Cal. 1976). Darwin v. Granger, 
174 cal.App.2d 63, 72, 344 P.2d 353, 358, would require that the 
biological father live with the mother and child "for a short 
period during which he represented the mother as his wife and the 
child as his own." The main theme is the establishment of a 
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normalized family relationship for at least some period of t~ 
The California Courts of Appeal have required that the 
child be physically received into the father's home, or "sett~ 
place of habitation," for a period of time. In re Reyna, 55 ~ 
App.3d 288, 298, 126 Cal.Rptr. 138, 145 {Ct.App.Cal. 1976); In 
Richard M., 14 Cal. 3d 783, 794, 122 Cal. Rptr. 531, 537, 537 P.: 
363, 371, {Cal. S.Ct. 1975); Guardianship of Truschke, 237 Cal. 
App.2d 75, 76-77, 46 Cal.Rptr. 601, 603, 604 (Cal.App. 1965). 
The courts have emphasized the propriety and necessi~ 
of a de facto family relationship as between the mother, the 
natural father and the child. In Truschke, supra, the lower 
court's determination denying the natural father's petition fc: 
appointment as guardian of his illegitimate child was upheldo: 
appeal, on the ground that he had not legitimated the child~ 
accord with §230. The facts closely resemble those of the cas! 
now under consideration, except for the fact that the fatheri: 
Truschke, unlike respondent, offered to marry his child's rnoth1 
In Truschke, the appellant contended that because he had offer< 
to marry the child's mother and had expended approximately $31' 
for a crib, baby clothes, and other necessities for the child': 
we fare before her birth, it should not be required that he tak; 
his child physically into his family circle to comply with th' 
terms of §230. In pertinent part, the court rejected appellan:1 
reasoning as follows: 
We cannot accept appellant's argument that because of 
his willingness and desire to receive his child into 
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his home and his purchase of a crib, baby clothes and 
equipment, he has constructively complied with §230. 
Appellant cites such cases as Lavell v. Adoption In-
stitute, 185 Cal.App.2d 557, S.Cal.Rptr. 365, and 
Estate of Abate, 166 Cal.App.2d 282, 333 P2d 200 in 
support of this contention. But the facts of those 
cases readily distinguish them from the case we now 
consider .... It clearly appears in each of these 
cases that there was an existing family unit into 
which the illegitimate child was born. Here no family 
unit has ever existed. It cannot properly be said 
that the casual and unfortunate relationship here in-
volved ever achieved the dignity of de facto family 
status, such as was present in both Lavell and Abate. 
Id., at 604 [Emphasis added] 
In In re: Adoption of Pierce,15 Cal.App.3d 244, 93 Cal. 
Rptr. 197 (Cal.App.1971), the appellant had publicly acknowledged 
his paternity. By stipulation and order of the court he had sup-
ported the child and has been allowed visitation with the child, 
the latter against the mother's protestations. On appeal, the 
court found that the appellant had acknowledged the child but 
that he had not received him "into his family" in accord with 
the strict construction of that phrase of §230 as held required 
in In Estate of DeLaveaga, 142 Cal.158, 75 Pac. 790. In arriving 
at this decision, the court discussed and found controlling the 
meaning of the term "family" as used in §230, as previously con-
sidered in Darwin v. Granger, 174 Cal.App.2d 63, 72, 344 P.2d 
35 3, 35 8: 
If a man has no wife, he can legitimate his offspring 
by a course of conduct which the conununity would con-
sider a public acknowledgment that he was the father 
of the child (Estate of Gird, 157 Cal. 534, 542-543, 
108 P. 499, 137 Am.St.Rep. 131) but the existence of 
such public acknowledgment by an unmarried man is a 
question to be decided on the circumstances of each 
case. Estate of Baird, 193 Cal. 225, 274-279, 223 P. 974. 
Where a man has no wife, he can publicly acknowledge his 
child notwithstanding the fact that he does not maintain 
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a household into which the child is taken. See Blythe 
v. Ayres, supra, 96 Cal. 532, 560, 592-593, 31 P.915; 
In re Jessup, 81 Cal. 408, 433-434, 21 P. 976, 22 P. 742. 
1028, 6 L.R.A. 594. If the man is unmarried the 'fam-
ily' referred to in section 230 may consist only of 
the father, the mother, and the child. Estate of Gird 
supra, 157 Cal. 534, 540, 108 P. 499; Serway v. ' 
Galentine, 75 Cal. App.2d 86, 90, 170 P.2d 32. Thus, 
an unmarried man may legitimate his offspring byJ:lVIna 
with the mother and child for a short period during ~ 
which he represented the mother as his wife and the 
child as his own. Serway v. Galentine, supra, 75 Cal. 
App.2d 86, 90-91, 170 P.2d 32. [Emphasis added) 
Pierce, at 195. 
Respondent has not received Corey into his family in u 
meaningful way. The child was not born into a family unit car· 
posed of appellant and respondent. To the contrary, the parh 
have never lived together; never have they functioned as a sin: 
social or economic unit. No de facto family, comprising appel· 
lant, respondent and Corey, has ever come into existence, larq' 
as a consequence of respondent's willful acts. 
For example, respondent refused to marry appellant in 
order to provide a home for Corey, proposing, as alternative 
solutions morally reprehensible to appellant, that Corey be 
aborted or adopted by strangers. (Trans. A, p. 57, 1. 19-p.51 
1. 10) And further, after Corey's birth, respondent did not 
offer to share the house he was purchasing with appellant and 
the child. He chose to continue living alone leaving appellm 
to fend for herself and her child as best she could. (Trans. 
p. 52, 1. 30-p. 53, 1. 3~ p. 59, 1. 16) 
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C. Because respondent has not held out Corey's mother, the 
appellant, to be his wife, the Court below erred in finding 
respondent to have legitimated the child. 
Sectio~ 78-30-12 must be construed to require that the 
biological father of an illegitimate child must, in order to 
legitimate him, receive the child into his family as if he were 
a legitimate child. No other construction is compatible with 
public policy. Note, 12 SO.CAL.L.REV. 97, 98 (1938). A legiti-
mate child is received and associated with his mother. Hence, 
consistent with the authorities cited herein, a child cannot be 
received into a family as a legitimate child unless his mother 
is held out to be his biological father's wife. 
At no timehas respondent represented appellant to be his 
wife and at no time has he represented Corey to be his legitimate 
son. Instead, by his every act, including bringing this action, 
he has chosen a course of action calculated to emphasize the 
illegitimacy of both relationships, disregarding the risk of 
exposing both Corey and his mother to shame and ridicule. 
D. Because appellant has not relinquished exclusive custody 
and control of Corey, the Court below erred in finding respon-
dent to have legitimated this child. 
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As discussed in detail in Point VII, infra, under Utah 
law, a mother has a superior right to custody and control of 
her child born out of wedlock. Where the mother retains custoc 
and control of the child, she may effectively preclude legiti-
mation by refusing to marry the father or by refusing to relin-
quish custody of the child to him. Cheryl Lynn H. v. Superior 
Court, 41 Cal. App.3d 273, 277-78, 115 Cal.Rptr. 849, 852, 
(Cal.App. 1974); In re Adoption of Irby, 37 Cal.Rptr. 879, 881 
(Cal. App. 1964). 
In Irby, supra, the court interpreted the holding in a 
previous case, Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal.2d 91, 265 P.2d 
888, as judicial recognition that, under the provision of §230 
of the California Civil Code, 
... There are two situations in which the father of 
an illegitimate child cannot legitimate the child 
even though he is willing to do so. The first situa-
tion is where his wife, who is not the mother of the 
child refuses to permit him to receive the child into 
the family circle, and the second is where the natural 
mother of the child refuses to give up custody of the 
child thereby preventing him from receiving the child. 
If either of these consents is lacking, he may not 
legitimate the child. Irby, supra, at 881. 
California's Second District Court of Appeal found the 
Irby reasoning, quoted above, and the holding therein, control· 
ling, and held that the appellant natural father, who sought 
reversal of a decree of adoption, had not legitimated his chl~ 
In re Adoption of Pierce, 15 Cal.App.3d 244, 93 Cal.Rptr. 171 
(Cal.App. 1971). 
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In Pierce, supra, the court reasoned that since the mother 
of an illegitimate child has the right to "custody and control 
of the child and therefore must (impliedly at least) consent to 
the legitimation of the child by its natural father," her 
stipulation to the natural father's visitation rights did 
not amount to consent to legitimation. 
Appellant has never relinquished her exclusive rights 
to custody and control of Corey. She has taken every step 
possible, as demonstrated by her defense in the Court below, 
to prevent erosion of these rights. 
E. Because respondent had not made meaningful contribution to 
Corey's support, the Court below erred in finding respondent 
to have legitimated this child. 
Although most of the cases cited herein do not require 
proof of support as a primary element in determining legitma-
tion, the payment of support remains a recognized index for 
determining motivation of the biological father. 
Until so ordered by Judge Winder, after trial in this 
matter, respondent made no meaningful contribution to Corey's 
support. In 1974,he gave appellant some "spare money." Re-
spondent testified to no support since 1974, stating that there 
was no particular reason for this delinquency. 
p. 37, 11.10-14) 
(Trans. A, 
Respondent paid nothing toward the support of appellant 
and her unborn child, thus forcing appellant to continue living 
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in a vermin-infested duplex without adequate heating and sanit 
tion facilities, where she remained with Corey, as a matter of 
financial necessity, until her marriage to Carmen R. Dennis. 
(Trans. A, p. 58, 11. 15-29; Trans. B, p. 14, 1. 25-p. 15, 1.; 
Respondent refused appellant's mother's plea for financial ast 
tance. (Trans. A, p. 58, 1. 30-p. 59, 1. 20) Respondent did pi 
appellant's hospital expenses, but only when requested to do s1 
by appellant's mother. (Trans. B, p. 18, 1. 5) 
Upon hearing the evidence adduced during only the first 
day of trial,Judge Winder stated, "I think he is a 'Johnny-cow 
lately,' and I am going to make a heavy order of support. I u 
tempted to make the order retroactive." (Trans. A, p. 67, 1. [ 
POINT VI. 
A FINDING THAT RESPONDENT HAD 
COMPLIED WITH §78-30-12 DID NOT 
COMPEL AN AWARD OF VISITATION 
RIGHTS TO RESPONDENT BY THE COURT 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Court below was not in err 
in finding the respondent to have complied with §78-30-12, uta· 
Code Annotated, 1953, it does not follow that the Court was co: 
pelled to grant visitation as a matter of right inherently f~ 
ing from such compliance. §78-30-12 provides as follows: 
The father of an illegitimate child, by publicly 
acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as such 
with the consent of his wife, if he is married, 
into his family, and such child is thereupon deemed 
for all purposes legitimate from the time of its 
birth. The foregoing provisions of this chapter 
do not apply to such an adoption. [Emphasis added] 
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Because he has admitted that he is Corey's biological 
father, respondent cannot claim to have adopted this child. 
"Adoption, properly speaking, refers only to persons who are 
strangers in blood," Black's Law Dictionary, (4th ed., 1968), 
and must thus be distinguished from legitimation or an attempt 
to legitimate. 
§78-30-12 is a literal copy of the California statute, 
which is found at §230 of the California Civil Code (1941). 
Therefore, as there are no Utah cases directly on point regard-
ing the construction of "adoption," "adopts," and the last sen-
tence of this statute, it is appropriate to refer to California 
case law pursuant to rules of judicial construction. 73 Am.Jur. 2d, 
Statutes, §166. 
The California Supreme Court has held that the final sen-
tence of §230--"The foregoing provisions of this chapter do not 
apply to such an adoption"--must be strictly construed, "neither 
adding to nor subtracting from its words." In re Lund's Estate, 
159 P.2d 643, 654. See also, Estate of McNamara, 181 Cal. 82, 
183 P. 552; 7 A.L.R. 313. 
Therefore, it follows that the rights conferred on fathers 
through adoption by §78-30-10 are not conferred through legitimation. 
This is consistent with the purpose of the legitimation statutes, 
which is to confer a status benefit upon the child, not to award 
a benefit to his father. Visitation should be awarded as a 
-23-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
privilege, not a right, and only if such an award is consistent 
with the child's best interest. 
Further, as it is uniformly recognized by the authorith 
that the best interests of the child must be afforded paramouru 
consideration, and as Dr. Goates had recommended termination ol 
respondent's visitation with the child, under any construction 
of the statutes in question, Judge Winder would not have ab~~ 
his discretion by denying the privilege of visitation to re~oo 
dent. Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 417, 421-28; Harkins, supra; Goldstc 
supra; Rozanski, supra; Sullivan, supra; Report, R 133. 
POINT VII. 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING 
TO RECOGNIZE APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO 
EXCLUSIVE CUSTODY AND CONTROL OVER 
HER OUT-OF-WEDLOCK CHILD 
Under Utah law, the living natural mother of an out-of-
wedlock child possesses a right to his full custody and contr~ 
This right is superior to the interests of all others, and is 
exclusive of them. See: State in the Interest of M, 25 Utah 2i 
101, 105, 476 P.2d 1013, 1015-17 (1970); Jensen v. Earley, 
63 Utah 604, 611-12, 228 Pac. 217, 219-20 (1924); R. Aaron, 
"Proposals for Truce in the Holy War: Utah Adoption," 1970 UTAH 
L.REV. 325, 331 (1970). The "custody and control" rights of th' 
natural mother are superior to and exclusive of the conceded~ 
"secondary" rights of the biological father. See: Annot., 45 
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A.L.R.3d 216, 223-24; Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 417, 431-34. This 
rule is consistent with the law of other jurisdictions. 98 A.L.R. 
2d 417 t 427-35 (1970), 
In Thomas v. Children's Aid Society of Ogden, 12 Utah 2d 
235, 364 P.2d 1029 (1961), this Court expressed the general rule 
regarding a biological father's rights: 
The putative father of an illegitimate child occupies 
no recognized paternal status at common law or under 
our statutes. The law does not recognize him at all, 
except that it will make him pay for the child's 
maintenance if it can find out who he is. The only 
father it recognizes as having any rights is the 
father of a legitimate child. 12 Utah 2d 235, at 
239, 364 P.2d 1029, at 1031-32 [Footnotes omitted] 
This rule was modified somewhat in State in the Interest 
of M, 25 Utah 2d 101, 476 P.2d 1013 (1970), which held that the 
acknowledged biological father of an illegitimate child has a 
legal right to care, control, and custody of his child, but only 
after the natural mother's superior rights have been lawfully 
terminated. For the purposes of the instant case, Thomas, supra, 
remains in force, unmodified. 
That the biological father has no "custody or control" 
rights over the child in opposition to the rights of the mother 
is expressly declared by the Utah legislature at §77-60-12, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. 
The father of such child shall not have the right to 
its custody or control, if the mother is living and 
wishes to retain such custody and control, until after 
it shall have arrived at the age of ten years, unless, 
upon petition by the District Court ... it shall be 
made to appear that the mother is not a fit person 
to have custody and control of said child .... 
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While this Court has not had an opportunity to apply thi 
statute to the issue of visitation presented here, courts in 
other states have decided cases grounded on similar statutes. 
For example, in DePhillips v. DePhillips, 219 N.E.2d 465 (Ill. 
1966) , the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the statutory 
denial to the father of "custody and control" rights over his 
illegitimate child necessarily involves denial of any legal 
visitation rights. The Illinois Court held visitation to be 
an element of "control" of the child, which statutorily vests 
in the natural mother. See also: Wallace v. Wallace, 210 N.E. 
2d 4 (Ill. 1965); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 56 Misc.2d 711, 289 
N.Y.S.2d 792, 794 (N.Y.City Ct. 1968). 
Respondent has filed an Acknowledgement of Paternity as 
required to establish "rights pertaining to paternity" pursw~ 
to §78-30-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
This statute was designed to accomodate the biological 
father's right prior to adoption, as recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (191: 
It concerns only his rights to notice and hearing after termini 
tion of the natural mother's rights before adoption by persons 
not biologically related to the child. The limited "rights 
pertaining to paternity" secured by this statute do not incl~ 
or create" custody and control" rights in conflict with those o: 
appellant under §77-60-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
Thus, the Court below erred in granting rights of visit 
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to the respondent, in violation of appellant's statutorily man-
dated right to full custody and control of her minor child. 
POINT VIII. 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING 
TO AFFORD APPELLANT THE SAME RIGHT 
TO WITHHOLD CONSENT TO LEGITIMATION 
AS HAS BEEN CONFERRED BY STATUTE ON 
THE WIFE OF A BIOLOGICAL FATHER 
Section 78-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, requires that 
the father of an illegitimate child, if married, must have the 
consent of his wife in order to receive this child into his family. 
If she withholds her consent, his child cannot be legitimated 
pursuant to this statute. 
There is no indication that this provision has ever been 
challenged in the Utah courts, though on its face, and as applied, 
hypothetic~lly, it would inequitably and arbitrarily deny some 
children born out of wedlock the status of legitimacy. 
The presumption arises that when the Utah legislature chose 
to incorporate §230 of the California Civil Code into Chapter 30 
of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as §78-30-12, it recognized 
this issue of unequal treatment. Therefore, it is submitted, 
the legislature was moved to enact this particular provision by 
what it found to be a more compelling principle of public policy --
the sanctity of the marital bond and the privacy of the family 
unit --the formal married state being favored by the law and all 
other major public and quasi-public institutions. 
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It follows that in enacting §78-30-12, the legislature 
recognized that were the biological father's wife's consent n~ 
required as a matter of law, there would be instances in whi~ 
a child could be brought into her home against her will, to the 
possible detriment of her relationship with her husband and to 
that of other intra-family relationships, including that of hus· 
band and wife to children born within their marriage, and that 
of the legitimated child to these children. Since the wife ~ 
a biological father is to be afforded total discretion to pnw 
legitimation, even if to the certain detriment of the child,~ 
why should this right not also be extended to the mother of t~ 
child, especially when to do so would be in the best interests· 
the child? 
The California courts, in having held, under §230 oft~ 
California Civil Code, that mothers of children born out of weo· 
lock are entitled to withhold consent to legitimation by biol~ 
cal fathers, appear to have considered this equal protection 
argument, however indirectly and cryptically. See , In re Adop· 
tion of Irby, In re Adoption of Pierce, and Darwin v. Granger, 
supra. 
The Court below erred in failing to recognize appellant' 
right to withhold consent to legitimation by the respondent, tt 
the detriment of Corey's best interests. Report, R 133, Trans. 
B, p. 32, 1. 20-p. 33, 1. 9. 
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POINT IX. 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN FAILING 
TO PROTECT DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN FAMILY RELATIONS 
AS IT BEARS UPON THE CHILD'S BEST 
INTERESTS. 
The courts have frequently emphasized the importance of the 
family. The United States Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska, 
262 U.S. 390 (1932) held that "liberty" under the Fourteenth 
Amendment denotes not only freedom from bodily restraL1t but 
also the right" ... to marry, establish a home and bring up chil-
dren... The Court considered these rights to be "essential." 
Id., at 399. The rights to conceive and to raise one's children 
were termed "basic civil rights of man," in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 
316 U.S.535, 541 (1942). Mr. Justice Burton, in May v. Anderson, 
345 U.S.528 (1953) described a mother's rights to the care and 
custody of her children as "rights far more precious ... than 
property rights." Id. at 533. "It is cardinal with us that the 
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, 
whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obli-
gations the state can neither supply or hinder," said the Court 
in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.158, at 166 (1944). 
This Court has been consistentin affirming these principles. 
In State in the Interest of M., 25 U.2d 101, 476 P.2d 1013 (Utah 
1970), the Court stated, "The right of a parent, under natural 
law, to establish a home and bring up children is a fundamental 
one and beyond the reach of any court. This rule applies to 
-29-
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illegitimate as well as legitimate children." Id., 25 U.2d, at 
107, 476 P.2d 103, at 1017. 
In recent years, the United States Supreme Court, as WI 
as other courts, has applied the "right of privacy" as it has 
evolved under specific constitutional guarantees to the marital 
and family relationships. The roots of this development can be 
traced through several decisions, such as Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S.510 (1925), in which the Court held unconsti-
tutional an Oregon law forbidding parents from sending their d 
dren to private schools. The act, the Court said, "unreasonahl 
interferes with the liberty of parents to direct the upbring~ 
and education of children under their control." Id., at 534-3) 
Two decades later, the Court commented in Prince v. Massachuset· 
supra, that the decisions in Pierce and Meyer, supra, "have re· 
spected the private realm of family life which the state cannot 
enter." Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Poe v. Ullman, 367[ 
497, 551-52 (1961), stated, "Certainly the safeguarding oft~ 
home does not follow merely from the sanctity of property right 
The home derives its pre-eminence as the seat of family life. 
And the integrity of that life is something so fundamental tha'. 
it has been found to draw to its protection the principles of 
more than one explicity granted constituional right .... " 
In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.479 (1965), the cour 
expressly brought marital relationship under the protection of 
the "right of privacy" in holding a Connecticut statute forbidd: 
use of contraceptive devices unconstitutional under the Four~ 
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Amendment. In the words of Mr. Justice Goldberg, concurring, 
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes 
that clearly underlie its specific guarantees demon-
strate that the rights to marital privacy and to marry 
and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude 
as the fundamental rights specifically protected. 
Id., at 495. 
Since Griswold, the United States Supreme Court has extended 
constitutional protections to safeguard the privacy of the indi-
vidual control of personal life, as in Planned Parenthood of 
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S.52 (1976), and in parental control 
of children and family relations, as in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205 (1972). In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court, per Mr. Chief 
Justice Burger, struck down the application of compulsory educa-
tion laws to Amish children, commenting, "a state's interest in 
universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally 
free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental 
rights and interests, such as ... the traditional interest of 
parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their chil-
dren Id., at 214. 
In the case now before this Court, appellant has married, 
resides with her husband, and is establishing a home and family 
of which her "illegitimate" son is an integral part. Corey, 
her son, benefits from the development of a secure, autonomous 
family unit under the control of the appellant and her husband. 
Therefore, the enforced intrusion of the respondent into the 
appellant's family should have been strictly scrutinized from 
the standpoint of Corey's interests in the privacy and security 
-31-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the appellant's marital and family relationships. 
The Court below, in awarding judgment to the respondent, 
erred in failing to protect these interests. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
For the following reasons, the Court below was in error 
in awarding rights of visitation to respondent and was in 
error in finding the respondent to have legitimated the child, 
absent the consent of appellant: 
(1) Although the child's best interests must be consider· 
ed paramount, the Court awarded visitation rights to respon-
dent absent any showing by respondent that visitation would 
benefit the child and in the face of Dr. Goates' recommenda-
tions against visitation, which were neither challenged nor 
rebutted by respondent; 
(2) Respondent was not and is not entitled to rights 
equal to those of a divorced father, for unlike the latter, 
he has never exercised actual or legal custody over the child, 
and has thus never assumed any significant responsibility for 
his daily supervision, education, protection, or care; 
(3) The child has not been legitimated by respondent fm 
the reasons that appellant has not relinquished custody and 
control of her child and has not consented to legitimation by 
respondent, respondent has not received the child into his 
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family, has not held out appellant to be his wife, and has 
made no significant contribution to the child's support. 
Sporadic visitation and mere "declaration of paternity" do 
not meet the requirements for legitimation pursuant to §78-
30-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953; 
(4) Assuming, arguendo, that respondent had legitimated 
the child, such a finding did not dictate an award of visita-
tion to respondent in the absence of evidence that such visita-
tion would be in the child's best interests; 
(5) The Court below erred in failing to recognize appel-
lant's right to exclusive custody and control over the child; 
(6) The Court below erred in failing to recognize appel-
lant's right to withhold consent to legitimation by respondent; 
(7) The Court below erred in failing to protect appel-
lant's right to privacy in family relations as it bears upon 
the child's best interests. 
CONCLUSION 
The controlling concern, inextricably a part of each 
issue discussed in the preceding pages, is the best interests 
of the child, not alleged rights of paternity. The evidence 
adduced at trial established that visitation was not in the 
best interests of the child, and consistent therewith, no 
reference to the child's best interests, present or future, 
is made in the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Decree entered in the Court below. 
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Therefore, even if considered solely on this ground, 
the award of visitation rights to respondent was in error. 
It is also submitted that the Court below was in error 
in finding respondent to have legitimated the child. This 
conclusion is also predicated on respondent's failure to act 
in the child's best interests, including his failure to syn-
thesize, at any time since the birth of the child, a normal 
family relationship incorporating himself, the child, and 
appellant. 
Appellant respectfully submits that she is entitled to ' 
a reversal of the lower Court's decision on the ground that 
legitimation of the child and visitation by respondent with 
the child are not in the child's best interests. In the alter-
native, should this Court determine that the Court below was 
not in error in finding respondent to have legitimated the 
child, appellant submits that reversal in part, finding the 
respondent not to be entitled to visitation with the child, 
would be appropriate and proper. 
DATED May 5, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief on 
Appeal were mailed to E. H. Fankhauser, attorney for respondent, 
430 Judge Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, United States 
mail, postage prepaid, on May 5, 1978. 
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